Religious Access to Public Programs and Government Funding by Kelley, Dean M.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 7
3-1-1994
Religious Access to Public Programs and
Government Funding
Dean M. Kelley
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Religion
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dean M. Kelley, Religious Access to Public Programs and Government Funding, 8 BYU J. Pub. L. 417 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol8/iss2/7
Religious Access to Public Programs and 
Government Funding 
Dean M. Kelley* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
This paper concerns the theme of "access," which puts 
religious claims for admission to the public arena on the same 
basis as other players. This characterization creates a winsome 
tilt in the direction of fair play, sounding in equal protection, 
such that anyone suggesting otherwise has an uphill task not 
to sound churlish and ill-natured. This paper contends that, 
although religious organizations may be welcome to participate 
in various public efforts to serve the common good, so long as 
they do not use participation as an occasion for proselyting or 
institutional aggrandizement, they are not entitled to 
government funding except in certain narrowly circumscribed 
conditions that are the subject of much debate. 
Because the debate is wide-ranging, it is necessary to set 
the limits of this paper. On the one hand, no one is seriously 
proposing that government support the churches and pay their 
clergy, nor would such a proposal be taken seriously if made. 
Whatever the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.I 
means, the last such arrangements for governmental support of 
churches in this country were terminated long ago by the few 
original states that had them.2 New states were not admitted 
to the Union unless their constitutions conformed with the 
federal principle on this subject. 3 On the other hand, few 
people this side of Madalyn Murray O'Hair are contending that 
religious organizations should be disqualified as such from 
* Counselor on Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches, since 1960; 
A.B. University of Denver, 1946; Th.M. Iliff School of Theology, 1949; author of 
five-volume treatise, THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA, forthcoming 
from Greenwood Press. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 75, 77-78 (1964) (Connecticut in 1818 and Massachusetts in 1833). 
3 ld. at 154-55. 
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making important contributions to the achievement of public 
objectives of the common good through their efforts in 
education, health care, moral reform, and ethical advocacy. The 
main disputes-at least for purposes of this paper-concern 
what role hybrid institutions founded, sponsored, and 
maintained by religious bodies play in publicly funded 
programs. Hybrid institutions are not exclusively or 
predominantly "religious" in the way that churches, 
synagogues, and mosques are thought to be; they are not as 
exclusively religious as the law sometimes supposes,4 but are 
also educational, medical, or social-welfare institutions as well. 
Hybrid institutions are the present-day reminders that 
Christian churches were actively concerned with education, 
health care, and charitable succor of the needy. This active 
concern extended beyond their own members to the population 
in general. The concern occurred long before governments 
showed any general solicitude for the non-elite or any 
consistent responsibility for those functions. Even when 
government was concerned, it often called upon churches to 
discharge the responsibility, as the state-sponsored churches in 
France preferred to make use of nurses from Roman Catholic 
orders or Protestant deaconess houses.5 It is government, not 
churches, that are the Johnny-come-latelies in these fields. As 
such, it is more than a little presumptuous for governments to 
be undertaking to instruct churches-via elaborate and often 
unrealistic and even self-contradictory regulations-how to do 
the work they were doing long before government took an 
interest in it. But that argument is independent of government 
funding, though it does have some implications for this 
discussion. 
4 "The churches ... themselves are not 'exclusively religious' in the sense 
that the . . . regulations require of their 'integrated auxiliaries.m Charles M. 
Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 
FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 899 (1977). 
5 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 517 (15th ed. 1974). 
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II. DISTINGUISHING EDUCATION AND WELFARE 
The law on religious access in the United States is 
curiously bifurcated between hybrid institutions of religion 
with education and hybrid institutions of religion with welfare. 
More accurately, the division is between institutions of religion 
with primary/secondary education and institutions of religion 
with higher education or welfare. A quick recapitulation of the 
law will make the distinction clear. 
A. Welfare and Higher Education 
The first case testing the application of the Establishment 
Clause to a hybrid institution was Bradfield v. Roberts.6 That 
case involved the construction of an isolation ward on the pre-
mises of Providence Hospital with funds of the District of Co-
lumbia. Providence Hospital was owned and operated by the 
Sisters of Charity of the Roman Catholic Church. The Supreme 
Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to that grant 
in a rather wooden opinion based upon the following supposi-
tions: (a) perusal of an organization's charter of incorporation 
reveals all that needs to be known about its nature and opera-
tion; (b) the mode of operation of a hospital is commonly known 
and generally recognized; (c) the religious beliefs of the propri-
etors thereof do not have any effect upon that mode of opera-
tion; (d) ecclesiastical supervision or control is not present, or if 
present does not affect its mode of operation; (e) the religious 
beliefs of the proprietors are not only irrelevant to the opera-
tion of the hospital, but it would be improper for the court to 
take cognizance of them; (f) the concern of the court with the 
establishment of religion is exhausted if the institution's char-
ter makes no mention of religion and its services are not "con-
fined to the members of that church"7; and, (g) the institution 
in question is subject to the control, not of the church, but "of 
the Government which created it" [in the sense of granting its 
corporate charter]. 8 
None of these suppositions would be generally accepted 
today and should not have been accepted in 1899. Certainly no 
religious body should accept the assumption that its ethical 
teachings and religious requirements do not have, cannot have, 
6 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
7 ld. at 298. 
8 !d. at 297-99. 
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and should not have any consequences for the operation of a 
hospital it owns and ostensibly manages. On the other hand, 
the embodiment of religious and moral norms in health care 
institutions-supported in part by public funds and treating 
non-adherents of that religion who may not subscribe to those 
norms-poses significant Establishment Clause questions with 
which some lower courts have struggled,9 but with which the 
Supreme Court has not. Bradfield set the standard by which 
U.S. courts have since generally dealt with challenges to gov-
ernment funding of hybrid institutions of religion and wel-
fare. 10 In time, the Court also applied this type of analysis to 
higher education.11 
B. Elementary and Secondary Education 
The case law dealing with elementary and secondary edu-
cation followed a rather different course, after recognizing that 
private schools-both religious and non-religious-have a right 
to operate.12 The Supreme Court found no Establishment 
Clause impediment in the public school district's supplying 
parochial school students with secular textbooks13 or bus 
transportation. 14 Everson v. Board of Education15 elicited the 
Supreme Court's first effort to spell out systematically what the 
Establishment Clause requires, In Everson, the Supreme Court 
formulated the so-called "no aid" test, stating that 
[t]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to 
or to remain away from church against his will or force him 
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can 
9 Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Chrisman v. 
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony 
Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (lOth Cir. 1973); O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial 
Hosp. Ass'n, 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 
413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 
397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 319 F. Supp. 252 
(D.C. 1970). 
10 See infra text accompanying note 58. 
11 See infra note 56. 
12 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
13 Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
14 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
15 !d. 
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be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended 
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."16 
Although the Everson formulation was repeated three times, 17 
it fell into desuetude until reasserted in 1989 by a narrow 
majority in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburh 
Chapter. 18 
Ill. THE LEMON TEST: APPUCATION TO EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE 
A. The Lemon Test 
In 1971 the United States Supreme Court conceived of 
another way to apply the Establishment Clause. Whether it 
replaced or supplemented the earlier "no aid" test was not clear 
until the five-member majority in Allegheny reiterated the "no 
aid" formula from Everson and characterized the test in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman19 as an effort to refine it: "First, the statute must 
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."o2o In Lemon the Court 
found that various state programs that benefited parochial 
schools did not pass the test because the efforts by the state to 
monitor those programs to ensure that no aid was given to 
religion created excessive entanglement between the state and 
religion. 21 This approach has been called a "catch 22" test by 
some members of the Court.22 
16 ld. at 15-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
17 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488 (1961) (no dissent); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
18 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
19 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
20 ld. at 612-13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
21 ld. at 613-14. For a counterargument to this characterization, see discus-
sion infra part III.D.l. 
22 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 
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B. Higher Education 
On the same day in 1971 that the Court announced the 
result in Lemon, it also issued a decision affecting church-relat-
ed higher education in Tilton u. Richardson,23 reaching an 
opposite conclusion. The decision held that government aid to 
colleges was permissible, finding that religiously affiliated col-
leges were not pervasively sectarian in the way that parochial 
schools were. The distinction rested on findings that the colleg-
es were not primarily engaged in religious indoctrination; their 
students were more mature and thus less susceptible to indoc-
trination, and they were not required to attend college by com-
pulsory education statutes.24 While these distinctions may be 
pertinent, they do not cut neatly between the Twelfth and Thir-
teenth years of schooling. Since then, decisions on Estab-
lishment issues in higher education have followed Tilton, such 
as Hunt u. McNair25 and Roemer u. Board of Public Works,26 
while lower education cases have, by and large, followed the 
course set by Lemon. 
C. The Parochial School Cases 
Mter the Supreme Court struck down in Lemon a program 
from Rhode Island for supplementing the salaries of parochial 
school teachers for teaching secular subjects27 and a program 
from Pennsylvania for the purchase of "secular education ser-
vices" from parochial schools,28 various states sought ways of 
easing the financial burdens of parochial schools that the Su-
preme Court might find acceptable, but without much suc-
cess.29 
U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). 
23 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
24 ld. at 685-86. 
25 413 u.s. 734 (1973). 
26 426 u.s. 736 (1976). 
27 DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp 112 (D.R.I. 1970), a({'d, Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
28 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp 35 (E.D. Penn. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971). 
29 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for 
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); New York v. Cathe-
dral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek 
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Public Funds for Pub. Sch. v. Marburger, 417 
U.S. 961 (1974); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 
U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
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Some thought a breakthrough had occurred (whether view-
ing it with approval or alarm) when the Supreme Court sus-
tained a Minnesota plan permitting a tax deduction to parents 
for expenditures for education whether in private or public 
schools in Mueller v. Allen.30 But two years later, programs 
from New York and Michigan that sent public school teachers 
into parochial schools were struck down by a bare majority on 
the grounds that the teachers might be led by their parochial 
surroundings to introduce sectarian teaching into their 
work.31 The rationale was unconvincing since it is hard 
enough to get parochial school teachers to teach religion in 
parochial schools, let alone public employees. The Court's effort 
to apply Lerrwn to increasingly subtle and ingenious programs 
produced increasingly splintered results. A striking example is 
Wolman v. Walter,32 which required a fifty-four-fold table to 
report the votes of nine justices on six programs. 
The Court has been unwilling to ban all forms of aid or to 
permit all forms of aid. Instead it has been groping between 
these extremes for a way to recognize and assist the public 
services rendered by parochial schools without opening the 
gates to such substantial or direct subsidization as would clear-
ly be state support to religious bodies for the advancement of 
their religions. One rationale the court has used is the child 
benefit theory, under which secular textbooks and bus trans-
portation are made available to all children regardless of the 
schools they might attend.33 That theory formed the rationale 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,34 
which was the first program of substantial federal aid to educa-
tion and which included some parochial students in its benefits. 
It has informed the Court's later decisions, such as Wolman,35 
where resources that a pupil might be able to obtain from a 
public library were permissible, but larger resources, such as 
sets of encyclopedias and globes of the world-that would not 
U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 
472 (1973). 
30 463 U.S. at 388. 
31 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 373. 
32 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
33 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1947); Board of Educ. 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968). 
34 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
35 433 U.S. at 229. 
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be obtainable by individual pupils-were deemed institutional 
acquisitions and were not allowed.36 
Some members of the Court have found some of the Court's 
distinctions perplexing, if not anomalous, and indeed the justic-
es in the majority have not always been very articulate in ex-
plaining their reasoning. 37 However, a pattern is discernible 
in the Court's decisions: the Court has generally invalidated 
direct monetary transfers to parochial schools and the grant or 
loan of equipment that would enhance the institution or ex-
pand its realty. Similarly the Court has generally rejected the 
assignment of public employees to parochial school premises, 
though its rationale was not as persuasive as another might 
have been: i.e., that such programs have the effect of expanding 
the staff of the school with adjunct personnel that in effect add 
to its faculty. Whether the Court will move in the direction of 
approving so-called ''voucher" plans for enabling parents to 
choose among public and private schools remains to be seen. 
The most recent such decision of the Court, Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District,38 may be a straw in the wind point-
ing toward acceptance of a "voucher" arrangement. In Zobrest, 
a deaf high school student was denied the services of a sign-
language interpreter solely because he attended a religious 
school. The Supreme Court held that the student could not be 
denied such publicly-financed services to which he was entitled 
solely because he chose to use them at a sectarian school. This 
holding, said the Court, flowed from the earlier decisions of 
Mueller v. Allen39 and Witters v. Washington.4° From these 
earlier cases the Zobrest Court derived the principle that any 
benefit flowing to the sectarian institution did so as a result of 
individual choices of recipients who were free to use them at 
any school, public or private, and any such benefit was inciden-
tal to the aid program and did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.41 
"Pervasively sectarian" is the shorthand rubric the Court 
has used for its distinction between those church-related agen-
36 Id. 
37 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). 
38 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). 
39 463 u.s. 388 (1983). 
40 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that a blind student entitled to educational 
aid could not be denied it because he wanted to use it for tuition at a Bible col-
lege for training as a missionary). 
41 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-68. 
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cies that can receive direct government aid and those that 
cannot. Parochial schools are said to be so pervasively sectarian 
that any aid they receive would inevitably redound to the ad-
vancement of their religious purpose.42 Institutions of higher 
education are not thought by the Court to be of that character, 
nor are social welfare or health care agencies, as evidenced in 
the Court's most recent wrestling with this issue, which in-
volved a program that had elements of both welfare and educa-
tion. That is the case of Bowen v. Kendrick.43 
D. Bowen v. Kendrick 
At issue in this 1988 decision was the Adolescent Family 
Life Act (AFLA),44 a 1981 program of federal grants to public 
and nonprofit private agencies "'for services and research in 
the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnan-
cy."'45 The grants were for "two types of services: 'care servic-
es,' for the provision of care to pregnant adolescents and ado-
lescent parents, and 'prevention services,' for the prevention of 
adolescent [pregnancy ]."46 Among these services were some 
described as "necessary services": "pregnancy testing and ma-
ternity counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, 
prenatal and postnatal health care, nutritional information, 
counseling, child care, mental health services, and . . . 'edu-
cational services relating to family life and problems associated 
with adolescent premarital sexual relations.' '>47 The program 
was designed to "serve several purposes, including the promo-
tion of 'self discipline and other prudent approaches to the 
problem of adolescent premarital sexual relations,' . . . the 
promotion of adoption as an alternative for adolescent parents," 
and other valuable services. 48 
In addressing these problems, Congress looked beyond 
governmental action, stating: 
42 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-13 (1988). For the text of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's proposition, see infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
43 487 U.S. at 589. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988). 
45 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1981)). 
46 !d. at 594 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-l(a)(7), (8) (1988)). 
47 !d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(4) (1988)). 
48 !d. at 593 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(l) (1988)). 
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[S]uch problems are best approached through a variety of 
integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and 
their families by other family members, religious and charita-
ble organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in 
the private sector as well as services provided by publicly 
sponsored initiatives; .... 49 
Grant applicants must describe how they would involve these 
various entities in the provision of the services funded by the 
Act. 5° 
Federal taxpayers and others brought the Bowen suit, 
charging that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. The 
federal district court applied the Lemon test and found that the 
Act failed to pass the second prong. It had the direct and imme-
diate effect of advancing religion because it expressly required 
grantees to involve religious organizations in the provision of 
services. The Act permitted religious organizations themselves 
to be grantees, thus enabling them with federal funds to teach 
adolescents about issues that could be considered "fundamental 
elements of religious doctrine," and contained no restrictions 
whatever against the teaching of "religion qua religion" or the 
inculcation of sectarian doctrines. 51 The court also concluded 
that because AFLA funds were used largely for counseling and 
teaching, overly intrusive monitoring would be needed to insure 
that religion was not advanced by such programs, thus violat-
ing the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. For 
these reasons, the court found the Act unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied. 52 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and the 
opinion of the five-member majority was delivered by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. That opinion followed the district court's 
approach of viewing the statute "on its face,"53 and, using the 
same Lemon test, reached an opposite result. The Court con-
cluded that "the services to be provided ... are not religious in 
character,"54 and that Congress was not precluded from enlist-
ing the help of religious organizations-along with nonreligious 
organizations-in solving the problems to which the Act was 
49 !d. at 595 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300z(a)(8)(B) (1988)). 
50 !d. at 596. 
51 !d. at 598-99. 
52 !d. at 598-99. 
53 !d. at 598. 
54 !d. at 604. 
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addressed. 55 The Court quoted one of its higher-education cas-
es to underscore this point: "'[R]eligious institutions need not 
be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally avail-
able to all."'56 This was a quintessential expression of the "ac-
cess" concept. 
The Bowen Court relied on Bradfield v. Roberts57 for the 
proposition that a church-related hospital could be aided in 
providing health care services because its affiliation with a 
church did not "alter the purely secular legal character of the 
corporation, particularly in the absence of any allegation that 
the hospital discriminated on the basis of religion or operated 
in any way inconsistent with its secular charter."58 The Court 
went on to say that even if the statute was neutral on its face, 
care must be taken that "direct government aid to religiously 
affiliated institutions does not have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion."59 The Court assured that result by utilizing 
the "pervasively sectarian" rubric: 
One way in which direct government aid might have that 
effect is if the aid flows to institutions that are "pervasively 
sectarian." We stated in Hunt [v. McNair] that "[a]id normally 
may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion 
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so perva-
sive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed 
in the religious mission .... " 
In this case, nothing on the face of the AFLA indicates 
that a significant proportion of the federal funds will be dis-
bursed to "pervasively sectarian" institutions .... [W]e do not 
think the possibility that AFLA grants may go to religious 
institutions that can be considered "pervasively sectarian" is 
sufficient to conclude that no grants whatsoever can be given 
under the statute to religious organizations. We think the 
District Court was wrong in concluding otherwise. 
Nor do we agree with the District Court that the AFLA 
necessarily has the effect of advancing religion because the 
religiously affiliated AFLA grantees will be providing educa-
tional and counseling services to adolescents. Of course, we 
55 ld. at 606-07. 
56 ld. at 608 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 
746 (1976)). 
57 175 u.s. 291 (1899). 
58 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (paraphrasing Bradfield, 175 
U.S. at 298). 
59 ld. 
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have said that the Establishment Clause does "prohibit gov-
ernment-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination 
into the beliefs of a particular religious faith," and we have 
accordingly struck down programs that entail an unaccept-
able risk that government funding would be used to "advance 
the religious mission" of the religious institution receiving 
aid . . . . But nothing in our prior cases warrants the pre-
sumption adopted by the District Court that religiously affili-
ated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their 
functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner. Only 
in the context of aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions 
have we invalidated an aid program on the grounds that 
there was a "substantial" risk that aid to these religious insti-
tutions would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in religious 
indoctrination. 
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion 
that the AFLA is invalid because it authorizes "teaching" by 
religious grant recipients on "matters [that] are fundamental 
elements of religious doctrine," such as the harm of premari-
tal sex and the reasons for choosing adoption over abor-
tion .... [T]he possibility or even the likelihood that some of 
the religious institutions who receive AFLA funding will 
agree with the message Congress intended to deliver to ado-
lescents through the AFLA is insufficient to warrant a finding 
that the statute on its face has the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion .... The facially neutral projects authorized by 
the AFLA-including pregnancy testing, adoption counseling 
and referral services, prenatal and postnatal care, educational 
services, residential care, child care, consumer education, 
etc.-are not themselves "specifically religious activities," and 
they are not converted into such activities by the fact that 
they are carried out by organizations with religious affilia-
tions.60 
The Court took note of the fact that there was no explicit 
prohibition in the text of the Act against the use of federal 
funding for religious purposes, but the Court observed that 
there was also "no intimation in the statute that at some point, 
or for some grantees, religious uses are permitted."61 Having 
determined that the Act was constitutional on it face, the Court 
60 ld. at 610-13 (citations omitted). 
61 ld. at 614. 
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remanded the case to the district court to determine whether it 
was being applied in a constitutional manner. 
Justice O'Connor, who was clearly the majority's swing 
vote, wrote a concurring opinion that suggested some sympathy 
for the views of the minority: 
[A]ny use of public funds to promote religious doctrines vio-
lates the Establishment Clause ... , [and] extensive viola-
tions-if they can be proved in this case-will be highly rele-
vant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abus-
es. For that reason, appellees may yet prevail on remand, and 
I do not believe that the Court's approach entails a relaxation 
of "the unwavering vigilance that the Constitution requires 
against any law 'respecting an establishment of religion.' "62 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a concurring 
opinion to try to narrow the scope of the remand. He insisted 
that if AFLA funds were shown to be going to a few "pervasive-
ly sectarian" institutions, that should not invalidate those 
grants.63 He maintained that "[t]he question in an as-applied 
challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious character, 
but how it spends its grant."64 
1. The dissent's view in Bowen 
Justice Blackmun presented a vehement dissent, joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. He began with sever-
al examples of AFLA grantees' engaging in explicitly religious 
indoctrination of persons coming to them for federally funded 
services.65 He found fault with the majority's analysis that 
focused on the words of the statute and thus did not confront 
the array of evidence of "real-world events" that spelled out the 
Act's operation.66 The majority had virtually disregarded the 
entire record compiled in the court below and had contented 
itself with "assumptions and casual observations about the 
character of the grantees.'.s7 He also found fault with the 
majority's use of the "pervasively sectarian" rubric as a way to 
avoid dealing with the actual operation of a wide range of reli-
62 ld. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting the dissent). 
63 ld. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
64 ld. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
65 ld. at 625-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
66 ld. at 627-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
67 ld. at 629 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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giously affiliated organizations, in which on a "continuum of 
'sectarianism' running from parochial schools at one end to the 
colleges ... in Tilton, Hunt and Roemer at the other, the AFLA 
grantees described by the District Court clearly are much closer 
to the former than to the latter."68 
The Court's decision, he insisted, was a "sharp departure 
from our precedents."69 Aid programs providing "nonmonetary, 
verifiably secular aid" had been upheld more readily in the past 
than direct cash subsidies, which required much closer scrutiny 
to make sure that the funds were not used to advance reli-
gion. 70 But AFLA authorized "various forms of outreach, edu-
cation and counseling services . . . in ways previously held 
unconstitutional.'m For instance, the Court had previously 
approved the purchase for use by pupils in parochial schools of 
secular textbooks approved for use in public schools, whereas 
there was no such requirement regarding teaching materials 
purchasable under AFLA. Justice Blackmun stated: 
The AFLA, unlike any statute the Court has upheld, pays for 
teachers and counselors, employed by and subject to the direc-
tion of religious authorities, to educate impressionable young 
minds on issues of religious moment .... 
. . . Whereas there may be secular values promoted by 
the AFLA, including the encouragement of adoption and pre-
marital chastity and the discouragement of abortion, it can 
hardly be doubted that when promoted in theological terms 
by religious figures, those values take on a religious nature. 
Not surprisingly, the record is replete with observations to 
that effect. It should be undeniable by now that religious 
dogma may not be employed by government even to accom-
plish laudable secular purposes .... 
. . . There is a very real and important difference be-
tween running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling 
pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions 
facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense, 
and of creating an appearance that the government is endors-
ing the medium and the message, is much greater when the 
religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with 
68 !d. at 631-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69 !d. at 634 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
70 ld. 
71 Id. 
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the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, 
than where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food or 
shelter.72 
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's char-
acterization of the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test as a 
"catch 22."73 Noting that it was still part of the Court's Es-
tablishment Clause standard, he wrote, "[t]o the extent any 
metaphor is helpful, I would be more inclined to characterize 
the Court's excessive entanglement decisions as concluding that 
to implement the required monitoring, we would have to kill 
the patient to cure what ailed him."74 In conclusion, Justice 
Blackmun addressed the statute in terms of Justice O'Connor's 
"endorsement" analysis: 
The AFLA, without a doubt, endorses religion . . . . [T]he 
statute creates a symbolic and real partnership between the 
clergy and the fisc in addressing a problem with substantial 
religious overtones. Given the delicate subject matter and the 
impressionable audience, the risk that the AFLA will convey 
a message of Government endorsement of religion is over-
whelming. The statutory language and the extensive record 
. . . make clear that the problem lies in the statute and its 
systematically unconstitutional operation, and not merely in 
isolated instances of misapplication. I therefore would find 
the statute unconstitutional without remanding to the Dis-
trict Court. 75 
IV. CRITIQUE AND COMMENTARY 
The judiciary has difficulty dealing with institutions and 
activities of a mixed character, where religious functions and 
purposes are mingled with secular functions and purposes. 
Indeed, some functions or purposes may at the same time be 
both secular and religious. The courts have trustingly embraced 
the simplifying fiction that the secular can be sorted from the 
religious easily and clearly in religiously affiliated hospitals, 
colleges, and social-welfare institutions, though not in parochial 
schools. But by neatly dividing the aid-eligible sheep from the 
non-eligible goats (and figuratively throwing the latter off the 
72 ld. at 638-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
73 ld. at 649 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
74 ld. 
75 /d. at 652 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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fleeing droshke to the wolves to save the former), this fiction 
may do a disservice to both sides. Parochial schools do perform 
secular functions, on the one hand, and church-related welfare 
agencies and colleges are not as devoid of religious purposes, 
atmosphere, and activities as the fiction might suggest. That is 
one reason, presumably, that Congress thought religious agen-
cies might have a uniquely effective contribution to make in 
modifying adolescent motivation and behavior intended in the 
AFLA. But if only those church-related agencies that are indis-
tinguishable from their "secular counterparts" are eligible to 
participate in the program, how is the unique contribution of 
the religious agency to be made? The expectation that religious 
agencies, in order to qualify for federal aid under the Act, will 
be duly sanitized of any religious elements is the other half of 
the judicial fiction. If the fiction becomes fact, and the religious 
agencies are sanitized of any religious elements, then the 
unique contribution that religion might make could well be 
eliminated. 
This paradox simply underscores the anomaly of 
government's hiring churches to perform "secular" services for 
the public. If the churches remain true to their religious mis-
sion, the government will be paying for religious as well as 
secular services and will thereby be aiding in the promulgation 
of religion. But if churches drop the religious part of their 
work, they may be failing their own distinctive role (and may 
not do the secular part too well either). However, the churches 
may have founded and maintained some of these "mixed" enti-
ties precisely to serve the common good in a nonsectarian way 
and not be seeking to advance religious or sectarian purposes 
thereby. In those instances the churches would not object to the 
sanitizing of such institutions in order to qualify for federal 
resources that would enable them to serve those in need in the 
general population and to serve more of them and serve them 
better. 
If that is indeed the case with certain church-related agen-
cies and institutions, then they can be set aside as not posing a 
church-state problem. Those are the instances in which the 
judicial fiction is not fiction but fact, and in those instances the 
entities are-for all practical purposes-virtually secularized. 
Along that path have gone Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia-
Presbyterian Hospital, Methodist Hospital (of Brooklyn, of 
Indianapolis, etc.) and many others. They were not secularized 
solely by the attractions of tax support, though that has been 
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the express purpose of the reorganization of Fordham Universi-
ty and other institutions founded and operated by religious 
orders that have put lay persons on their boards of trustees. 
When an institution seeks to appeal to a broader public for its 
clientele and support, it begins to shape itself to fit the expecta-
tions of that broader public and so becomes less responsive to 
the intentions of the founding church. That process is an inev-
itable gravitational gradient that will draw the institution 
away from the church because it requires greater energy to 
maintain the institution as an effective religious entity than to 
succumb to the pressures for conformity to the expectations of 
the general public. The strictures that rightfully accompany 
governmental support only make that process of secularization 
more rapid. 
So a church that wishes to maintain a religious thrust and 
content to its institutions of education or welfare is making 
that task much harder for itself by accepting the support of the 
public fisc and the requirements that properly go with it. But, 
some may ask, is that the look-out of the state? If the church 
wants to take that risk, why not let it? Is it the responsibility 
of the courts, in applying the Establishment Clause, to keep 
the churches and their institutions "pure and undefiled?" 
Thomas Jefferson thought it was. In his famed Bill for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom (in Virginia) he argued: "it [state 
sponsorship of religion] tends to corrupt the principles of that 
very religion it is meant to encourage ... ; though indeed these 
are criminal who do not withstand such temptation, yet neither 
are those innocent who lay the bait in their way."76 James 
Madison, in his opposition to Patrick Henry's bill for public 
support of teachers of the Christian religion, insisted that that 
proposal was improper "[b]ecause experience witnesseth that 
ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity 
and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.'177 The 
entire thrust of both these seminal historic adjurations was 
that government had no business offering preferences and 
emoluments to religious bodies, whether they accepted them or 
not. That conviction is firmly endorsed by many Americans 
76. ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEU-
TRAUTY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 740 (4th ed. 1992). 
77. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(citing JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS As-
SESSMENTS 'II 7 (circa June 29, 1785)). 
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today who adhere to the dicta in Everson that government 
cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or 
prefer one religion over another.'178 
The very terms on which church-related schools and agen-
cies are allowed access to public programs and government 
funding are designed to render them nonsectarian and 
spiritually innocuous-virtually identical with the public and 
nonreligious private entities to which they should be a correc-
tive, examplary and challenging influence. How can they offer 
their distinctive and unique witness and service if they are 
wired into the very structure that needs improvement? On the 
other hand, they can play a more ameliorative role as light or 
leaven by preserving their own faith-fueled and gospel-formed 
devotion to selfless service that-at its best-has marked the 
churches' contribution to human welfare through the centuries, 
primarily when they have been reliant upon the volunteer 
efforts of the faithful. 
There are those who would resolve the paradox by allowing 
the church-related institutions or agencies to retain their full 
religious character, even though supported in part by govern-
ment funding. That was the solution effected by Congress in 
the aptly designated Church Amendment (named after Senator 
Frank Church, D-ldaho). That amendment permitted church-
related hospitals to refuse to allow sterilization or abortions 
even though funded by Hill-Burton funds "if the performance of 
such procedure ... is prohibited by the entity on the basis of 
religious beliefs or moral convictions.''79 Somehow that logic 
did not seem to apply to Bob Jones University, which lost its 
tax exemption for trying, as a corollary of its faith, to prohibit 
78. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (emphasis added). The 
most recent official expression on this subject by a major Protestant body was the 
Policy Statement adopted by the 200th General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church, covering a wide range of church-state issues and stating that 
[s]ince each state guarantees the right to a free public elementary and 
secondary education and maintains universally accessible institutions for 
that purpose, we oppose as a matter of public policy the use of substan-
tial public funds to support private educational systems, including tax 
deductions or credits and use of educational vouchers. 
God Alone Is Lord of the Conscience, POLICY STATEMENT, 200TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, U.S. 32 (1988). 
79. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(b), PuB. L. No. 93-45, 87 
Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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interracial dating and marriage among its students and facul-
ty.so 
V. THE EDGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Religious liberty means that religious bodies and their 
adherents should be able to pursue their faith-related goals, 
chosen patterns of devotion, and obedience to their spiritual 
vision without outside interference or inhibition, so long as 
they do not clearly jeopardize public health or safety or the like 
rights of others. That is the message of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment81 (or it was until the Supreme 
Court revised it on April 17, 1990, in Employment Division v. 
Smith82). But when they take the whole population into part-
nership in that enterprise through some form of tax support, 
the situation changes, and the Establishment Clause, which is 
the other half of the First Amendment's provision about reli-
gion, comes into play. The message of the Establishment 
Clause is that government should not sponsor or promote the 
promulgation of any religion or show favoritism for one religion 
over another or favor religion over the absence of religion. 
But how does that happen if government simply allows the 
tax dollars of a portion of the population to finance the services 
they need-and to which they are entitled-in institutions in 
which they are "at home" and feel more comfortable than they 
would in the sterile, or even amoral, settings of public institu-
tions? For example, elementary schooling is one of the most 
vital services in modern society and is required by law for all 
children. It is a service that many public institutions are not 
doing very well, partly because of bureaucratization, unioniza-
tion, and homogenization, partly because of the strictures that 
apply to tax-supported institutions (nondiscrimination, due 
process, "sunshine" rules, etc.), and partly because they must 
accept and try to teach the children that no one else wants to 
teach. If private, including church-related, schools want to 
share in public revenues, they are buying into the same struc-
ture and conditions that produced some of the ailments of pub-
lic education. The way to avoid those ailments is to avoid one of 
the main causes, the public fisc and its requirements. 
80. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
82. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
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That is not the only consideration. In the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, as elementary education was becoming systematized and 
publicly supported, churches faced a significant policy choice. 
How would they carry on their task of inculcating the faith in 
the children of the faithful? Protestants, by and large, were 
content to continue supplementing general education (in the 
burgeoning public schools) by religious education in the church 
on Sundays. It was easy for them to make that choice because 
they were the dominant element in society, and the public 
schools at the time reflected their religious views and culture. 
They felt "at home" in the public schools in a way that Roman 
Catholics and Jews did not; in fact, the public schools were 
almost like "parochial schools" for the Protestant majority. So 
Roman Catholics (and later some of the more orthodox Jews) 
undertook the herculean task of setting up private elementary 
schools for the general and religious education of their children. 
So well have they succeeded that today their schools are often 
outperforming the public schools. 
But if the decision should now be made to provide public 
support for those private schools, it would mean that the public 
would be aiding and advancing one particular mode of religious 
education to the disadvantage of those religious groups who 
had put their reliance in another mode. The natural conse-
quence would be that other religious groups would be drawn to 
the favored mode of inculcation (as many of them are already, 
even without public subvention). Public schools would fall even 
farther behind, having to try to teach the dwindling population 
composed increasingly of the most intractable pupils rejected 
by the various private systems and with dwindling resources to 
do so. This would not only be catastrophic for the education of 
the public as a whole but would be detrimental to the private 
schools themselves if they began, as they surely would, to suf-
fer some of the same strictures that have afflicted public 
schools, because they would begin to become subject to some of 
the same causes. 
The same principles apply, perhaps less acutely, to the 
fields of welfare and higher education. If churches are trying to 
do something inspired by their faith-vision, something unique 
and significantly different from the generally accepted way of 
doing things, then they are asking for trouble by going into 
partnership with the government. However inviting the pros-
pect, and however accommodating the government may seem to 
be (at the time), tax rrwney is political money. The rules may 
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change without notice after the church has grown into a pat-
tern of dependency that no longer leaves it as free to choose 
another path. Partnerships with government are unequal part-
nerships because the government is always the senior partner. 
These are unstable partnerships because the slope of dependen-
cy increases with time, leaving the church less and less able to 
effectuate its original spiritual vision, with a continuous atten-
uation of its proprietorship. 
There are those who imagine ingenious new ways to work 
out such partnerships that are designed to mitigate these haz-
ards, but the bottom line is that the government remains ac-
countable for the use of public resources and so it cannot sim-
ply abandon responsibility for what the private partner does. 
On the contrary, it is the nature of bureaucracy to centralize, 
rationalize, routinize, and systematize that for which it is re-
sponsible, and to expand the area of its responsibility. Sooner 
or later the private partner finds itself pressed into an ever 
smaller compass, devoting more and more of its attenuating 
energies to carrying out routine administrative tasks and less 
and less to embodying its spiritual vision. Therefore, the course 
of wisdom for any church-related enterprise seeking to pursue 
a spiritual vision might be to avoid like the plague any entan-
glement with government. 
Whether a church eschews the path of dependency on gov-
ernment or not, citizens of other faiths and those of no faith 
have a legitimate concern that the resources, which they con-
tribute under duress of law to serve the common good, are not 
used in such a fashion as to advance religious doctrines that 
they do not share or to aggrandize the institutions that promul-
gate those doctrines, either through enhancing the realty or 
expanding the personnel thereof. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 
the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom: 
[T]o compel [anyone] to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is 
sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support 
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriv-
ing him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions 
to the particular pastor whose morals he would make his 
pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righ-
teousness.83 
83. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (quoting 12 Hening, 
Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823)). 
438 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
And James Madison likewise advised: 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish 
Christianity ... may establish with the same ease any partic-
ular sect of Christians ... ? That the same authority which 
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his prop-
erty for the support of any one establishment, may force him 
to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoev-
er?B4 
In addition, if government contracts with private, religious-
ly affiliated providers for public services that citizens of various 
faiths or of no faith may need, some citizens may resist going 
to what they may view as a false or alien faith-group for those 
services. While adherents of the provider's faith-group may find 
that setting more comfortable, non-members may find it corre-
spondingly uncomfortable. If the argument about comfort works 
in the first instance, it cuts both ways. The upshot is that no 
one should have to go to or through a religiously affiliated 
entity to obtain the civic benefits to which he or she is entitled. 
This means that there should be public or nonsectarian private 
alternatives available for the provision of civic welfare or edu-
cational services. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Religious people and organizations have vital contributions 
to make to society. They should be encouraged to make 
them-mainly on a volunteer basis. For the public to pay are-
ligious body to do so introduces an element that, sooner or 
later, will impede the religious body in making its distinctive 
contribution that flows from its spiritual vision and will inhibit 
the civic community from developing nonsectarian sources for 
meeting the needs of all its citizens. While contracts for servic-
es with religiously affiliated providers may be a useful way for 
the civic community to meet its needs on a short-term or emer-
gency basis, in the long run such arrangements are inherently 
unstable, unequal, and detract from the ability of both church 
and state to fulfill their respective functions. 
84. ld. at 65 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting MADISON, supra note 77, 'II 3). 
